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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Producers of pornography oftentimes depict young-
looking performers who appear as if they could be children but 
might, in fact, be adults.  In that circumstance, producers and 
law enforcement alike cannot know, absent proof of 
performers’ ages, whether these sexually explicit scenes 
involve children and violate laws prohibiting the production of 
child pornography.  To combat that problem and protect 
children from sexual exploitation, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2257 and 2257A (collectively, “the Statutes”).  The Statutes 
require producers of pornography to verify the age and identity 
of each person portrayed, to keep records of the age 
verification, and to label each depiction with the location 
where law enforcement may obtain those records.  In this 
cross-appeal, we consider First Amendment challenges 
brought by twelve plaintiffs, including two associations, 
involved in the production of pornography covered by the 
Statutes.  The plaintiffs claim that the age verification, 
recordkeeping, and labeling requirements, the implementing 
regulations for those requirements, and the Statutes’ criminal 
penalties for noncompliance unnecessarily restrict their 
freedom of speech.  They therefore assert that those provisions 
violate the First Amendment as applied to them and are facially 
invalid under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 
 
This lawsuit, filed in 2009, has been litigated over the 
course of a decade, and we laud the District Court for its 
skillful handling of this complex case throughout.  The First 
Amendment challenges have resulted in three prior opinions 
from this Court.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. 
(“FSC I”), 677 F.3d 519 (3d Cir. 2012); Free Speech Coal., Inc. 
v. Att’y Gen. (“FSC II”), 787 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2015); Free 
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Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (“FSC III”), 825 F.3d 149 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  In the latest of those decisions, we remanded for 
the District Court to evaluate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
claims under strict scrutiny.  The District Court, on the parties’ 
cross-motions for entry of judgment, then ruled that (1) the two 
association plaintiffs lack standing to bring as-applied First 
Amendment challenges; (2) the remaining ten plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment as-applied challenges are meritorious, but only 
with respect to certain categories of claimants, and the 
Statutes’ criminal penalties for the unconstitutional provisions 
cannot be enforced; (3) the plaintiffs failed to prove their facial 
overbreadth claim; and (4) as a remedy for the successful as-
applied claims, the plaintiffs are entitled to a so-called 
nationwide injunction. 
 
Applying strict scrutiny, we agree with the District 
Court in part.  First, the District Court correctly held that the 
two association plaintiffs lack standing to bring as-applied 
First Amendment claims on behalf of their members.  Second, 
we will affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court’s 
ruling on the remaining ten plaintiffs’ as-applied claims.  We 
conclude that the age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling 
requirements all violate the First Amendment as applied to 
those plaintiffs.  The Government conceded that the Statutes’ 
requirements need not apply when sexually explicit depictions 
show performers who are at least thirty years old because at 
that age, an adult performer could not reasonably appear to be 
a child.  So for these plaintiffs — who must comply even for 
their performers who are at least thirty years old — the 
requirements are not the least restrictive way to protect 
children.  As a result, the Statutes’ criminal penalties for 
noncompliance with those requirements cannot be enforced 
against the successful as-applied plaintiffs.  Third, we hold, as 
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the District Court did, that the age verification, recordkeeping, 
and labeling requirements are not facially invalid under the 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine because the plaintiffs 
failed to prove that those provisions improperly restrict a 
substantial amount of protected speech relative to the Statutes’ 
plainly legitimate sweep.  Fourth, the District Court erred in 
entering what the Government labels a nationwide injunction 
because that remedy was broader than necessary to provide full 
relief to those plaintiffs who prevailed on their as-applied 
claims.  Given these holdings, we will affirm in part, reverse in 
part, vacate in part, and remand for the District Court to afford 
relief consistent with this opinion and limited to those plaintiffs 
who brought meritorious as-applied claims. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Statutes and Their Implementing Regulations 
 
Congress has criminalized the production of 
commercial child pornography since 1978 and noncommercial 
child pornography since 1984.  See FSC I, 677 F.3d at 525 
(describing Congress’s efforts to curtail child pornography).  In 
1986, the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 
issued a final report, finding that despite Congress’s efforts to 
criminalize the production of child pornography, producers of 
sexually explicit depictions generally sought out young-
looking performers.  Id. at 525–26 (citing Attorney General’s 
Commission on Pornography, Final Report (“Report”) 618 
(1986)).  The use of young-looking performers “made it 
increasingly difficult for law enforcement officers to ascertain” 
whether these performers were children or young-looking 
adults, id. at 526 (quoting Report at 618), and it was “nearly 
impossible . . . to effectively investigate potential child 
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pornography,” id. at 535 (citing Report at 618).  The Report 
therefore concluded that although child pornography 
legislation had “drastically curtailed [child pornography’s] 
public presence,” id. at 525 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Report at 608), that legislation “did not end the problem,” id.; 
“an extensive interstate market for child pornography 
continued to exist,” id. at 535 (citing Report at 608–09); and 
“no evidence . . . suggest[ed] that children [were] any less at 
risk than before,” id. (alterations in original) (quoting Report 
at 609).   
 
In response to the Report, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257 as part of the Child Protection and Obscenity 
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7513, 102 
Stat. 4181, 4487.  FSC III, 825 F.3d at 154.  Section 2257 
imposes various requirements on those who produce visual 
depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct,” mandating 
that these producers collect information to demonstrate that the 
individuals depicted are not children.  18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)–(b).  
Later, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2257A as part of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109–248, § 503, 120 Stat. 587, 626–29, to place similar 
requirements on producers of depictions of “simulated sexually 
explicit conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2257A(a).1   
 
1  For both § 2257 and § 2257A, “sexually explicit 
conduct” means “(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-
genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether 
between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) 
masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) 
lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any 
person.”  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A); see also 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(n) 
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Three of these Statutes’ requirements are at issue.  First, 
a producer must examine “an identification document” for 
every performer portrayed to ascertain each performer’s name 
and date of birth, and must ascertain any other name that the 
performer has previously used.  Id. §§ 2257(b)(1)–(2), 
2257A(b)(1)–(2).  Second, the producer must “create and 
maintain individually identifiable records” of that information.  
Id. § 2257(a), (b)(3); id. § 2257A(a), (b)(3).  Third, the 
producer must label “every copy” of the depiction by affixing 
“a statement describing where the records required . . . may be 
located,” in the “manner and . . . form” prescribed by 
regulation.  Id. §§ 2257(e)(1), 2257A(e)(1).  The United States 
Department of Justice has promulgated implementing 
regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 75.1 et seq., that further refine the 
Statutes’ requirements, see id. §§ 75.2–75.4 (recordkeeping 
requirement); id. §§ 75.6, 75.8 (labeling requirement). 
 
The age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling 
requirements apply to both “primary” and “secondary” 
producers.  See id. § 75.1(c) (defining the word “[p]roducer” 
in the Statutes).  A primary producer is “any person who 
actually films, videotapes, photographs, or creates a . . . visual 
depiction of an actual human being engaged in actual or 
simulated sexually explicit conduct.”  Id. § 75.1(c)(1).  A 
secondary producer, by contrast, is “any person who,” for such 
a visual depiction, (a) “produces, assembles, manufactures, 
 
(providing that “[s]exually explicit conduct has the meaning 
set forth in” § 2256(2)(A)).  Performers engage in “[s]imulated 
sexually explicit conduct” if a “reasonable viewer” would 
“believe that the performers engaged in actual sexually explicit 
conduct, even if they did not in fact do so.”  28 C.F.R. § 
75.1(o). 
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publishes, duplicates, reproduces, or reissues” the depiction for 
“commercial distribution”; (b) “inserts on a computer site or 
service a digital image of” the visual depiction, or “otherwise 
manages the sexually explicit content of a computer site or 
service that contains” it; or (c) “enters into a contract, 
agreement, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.”  Id. 
§ 75.1(c)(2).2  A secondary producer may satisfy the Statutes’ 
requirement to “create and maintain records” by “accepting . . 
. copies of the records” created and maintained by the primary 
producer of that depiction, and by keeping records of the 
“name and address of the primary producer from whom he 
received copies of the records.”  Id. § 75.2(b).  “The same 
person may be both a primary and a secondary producer.”  Id. 
§ 75.1(c)(3). 
 
The Statutes criminalize the failure to comply with their 
requirements.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2257(f), 2257A(f).  A first-time 
violator of § 2257 is subject to a five-year maximum term of 
imprisonment.  Id. § 2257(i).  Subsequent violations are 
punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least two years and 
up to ten years.  Id.  Violations of § 2257A are subject to a one-
year maximum term of imprisonment, unless the violation 
involves an effort to conceal a substantive offense involving 
the use of a minor in sexually explicit depictions.  Id. 
§ 2257A(i)(1)–(3).  In that case, the sentencing range is the 
same as the range for violating § 2257.  Id. § 2257A(i)(2)–(3). 
 
 
 
2  Producers do not include photo or film processors, 
distributors, or telecommunications service providers.  28 
C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(4).  
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B. Procedural History 
 
The twelve plaintiffs “are a collection of individuals, 
commercial entities, and interest groups who are engaged in or 
represent others involved in the production of images covered 
under the Statutes,” including two trade associations, Free 
Speech Coalition, Inc. (“FSC”) and the American Society of 
Media Photographers (“ASMP”).3  FSC III, 825 F.3d at 156.  
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in 2009, seeking declaratory 
relief and an injunction against enforcement of the Statutes and 
regulations, based on the First Amendment and other 
 
3  Specifically, the plaintiffs are (1) FSC, “a trade 
association representing more than 1,000 member businesses 
and individuals involved in the production and distribution of 
adult materials”; (2) ASMP, “a trade association representing 
photographers”; (3) “Thomas Hymes, a journalist who 
operates a website related to the adult film industry”; (4) 
“Townsend Enterprises, Inc., doing business as the Sinclair 
Institute, a producer and distributor of adult materials created 
for the purpose of educating adults about sexual health and 
fulfillment”; (5) “Carol Queen, a sociologist, sexologist, and 
feminist sex educator”; (6) “Barbara Nitke, a faculty member 
for the School of Visual Arts in New York City and a 
photographer”; (7) “Marie L. Levine, also known as Nina 
Hartley, a performer, sex educator, and producer of adult 
entertainment”; (8) “Betty Dodson, a sexologist, sex educator, 
author, and artist”; (9) “Carlin Ross, who hosts a website with 
Dodson providing individuals ashamed of their genitalia with 
a forum for anonymously discussing and posting images of 
their genitalia”; and (10, 11, 12) “photographers Barbara 
Alper, David Steinberg, and Dave Levingston.”  FSC III, 825 
F.3d at 156 n.3 (quotation marks omitted). 
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constitutional grounds.  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 524–25.  Since then, 
the case has reached us three times. 
 
In this fourth appeal, only the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment challenges remain.  The plaintiffs claim that the 
age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling requirements, and 
the attendant criminal penalties for noncompliance, violate the 
First Amendment as applied to them, and that the Statutes’ 
requirements should be invalidated facially under the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  We have considered the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims in our three previous 
decisions, so we describe those aspects of our prior opinions as 
relevant context. 
 
1. FSC I 
 
In this case’s first appeal, we reviewed the District 
Court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment as-
applied and overbreadth claims.  The District Court determined 
that the Statutes’ requirements were content-neutral 
regulations of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny, and that 
the plaintiffs failed to state an as-applied or overbreadth claim.  
See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 
698, 726 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
   
Our decision in FSC I affirmed in part and vacated in 
part the District Court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claims, and remanded for further proceedings.  
677 F.3d at 525.  We agreed with the District Court that the 
Statutes’ requirements were content-neutral regulations of 
speech subject to intermediate scrutiny, reasoning that 
“Congress singled out the types of depictions covered by the 
Statutes not because of their effect on audiences or any 
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disagreement with their underlying message but because doing 
so was the only pragmatic way to enforce its ban on child 
pornography.”  Id. at 534.  We also agreed with the District 
Court that under intermediate scrutiny, the Statutes’ 
requirements advance a substantial governmental interest in 
“protecting children from sexual exploitation by 
pornographers” and “leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”  See id. at 533, 535, 536 n.13.  But we 
vacated the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ as-
applied and overbreadth claims because the plaintiffs should 
have been “afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery and 
develop the record regarding whether the Statutes are narrowly 
tailored,” id. at 533, and “[t]he degree of the asserted 
overbreadth,” id. at 538.  
 
2. FSC II 
 
Following our remand and the completion of discovery, 
the District Court held an eight-day bench trial in June 2013.  
See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 957 F. Supp. 2d 564, 
568, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  In a post-trial opinion analyzing the 
evidence presented at trial, the District Court ruled that the 
Statutes’ requirements and their implementing regulations 
survived intermediate scrutiny as applied to the plaintiffs, id. 
at 589, and that the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim failed, id. at 
594.   
 
On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s order 
denying the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.  See FSC II, 
787 F.3d at 172.  As a threshold matter, we held that the two 
association plaintiffs, FSC and ASMP, lacked associational 
standing to bring as-applied First Amendment claims on behalf 
of their members.  We explained that for FSC and ASMP to 
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bring as-applied claims on behalf of their members, they had 
to show that their claims did not require an “individualized 
inquiry” for each member.  Id. at 153–54.  The two associations 
could not establish associational standing because under 
intermediate scrutiny, FSC and ASMP’s as-applied claims 
turned on “the degree to which [each] individual producer’s 
speech [was] unnecessarily burdened.”  Id. at 154.  So, 
“[i]dentifying those members for whom the Statutes may be 
unconstitutional . . . require[d] an individualized inquiry.”  Id.  
Even though FSC’s and ASMP’s members “collectively 
produce a significant portion of the works generated by the 
adult film industry,” that was insufficient for associational 
standing because “aggregating that industry’s speech in toto 
[would be] an improper method for identifying the burdens 
imposed on specific members.”  Id.  “Generalized statements 
regarding the adult film industry’s speech” could not “replace 
the individualized inquiry required.”  Id.  Thus, FSC and 
ASMP lacked associational standing to bring as-applied claims 
on behalf of their members.  Id. 
 
We also rejected the remaining ten plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment as-applied claims.  Under intermediate scrutiny, 
applying the Statutes to the plaintiffs served the Government’s 
interest in protecting children by preventing the plaintiffs 
“from depicting minor performers, either purposefully or 
inadvertently,” id. at 156, given that each plaintiff “employ[s] 
a substantial number of youthful-looking models” who look 
like they could be children but might, in fact, be young-looking 
adults, id. at 159.  We recognized that the Statutes also cover 
circumstances when the plaintiffs create sexually explicit 
depictions of individuals who are unquestionably adults, and 
that regulating those depictions did “nothing” to protect 
children.  Id. at 156.  Still, the Statutes and regulations were 
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sufficiently tailored under intermediate scrutiny because the 
“qualitative” burden of compliance for clearly adult performers 
was “minimal,” and intermediate scrutiny does not require 
using “the least restrictive” means.  Id. at 152. 
 
Last, we upheld the Statutes’ requirements in the face 
of the plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge.  Id. at 166.  We 
credited the plaintiffs’ showing that there were some 
impermissible applications of the Statutes to those who 
produced depictions of unquestionably adult performers, and 
to depictions created by, and exchanged between, consenting 
adults solely for private use.  Id. at 164.  Even so, after 
examining the evidence presented at trial concerning how 
widely those applications extend, we concluded that the 
“invalid applications of the Statutes . . . pale in comparison 
with the Statutes’ legitimate applications,” id., a decision 
buttressed by the “surpassing importance” of the governmental 
interest in protecting children, id. at 166.  
 
3. FSC III 
 
After our decision in FSC II, the plaintiffs petitioned for 
panel rehearing based on the Supreme Court’s then-new 
decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).  
According to the plaintiffs, the Reed decision dictated that the 
Statutes’ requirements were content-based restrictions on 
speech, not content-neutral restrictions, and therefore should 
be reviewed under strict scrutiny, a standard more onerous than 
intermediate scrutiny.  We granted panel rehearing to address 
that question and vacated our decision in FSC II.  FSC III, 825 
F.3d at 158. 
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On panel rehearing, we agreed with the plaintiffs that 
the Statutes’ requirements were content-based restrictions on 
speech subject to strict scrutiny based on the Supreme Court’s 
Reed decision.  Id. at 153.  There, the Supreme Court held that 
a town sign code was “content based on its face” because its 
restrictions “depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content 
of the sign.”  Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court explained that if a law is “content based 
on its face,” then that law “is subject to strict scrutiny 
regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral 
justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained in 
the regulated speech.”  Id. at 165 (quotation marks omitted).  
Following that instruction from Reed, we concluded that our 
prior analysis in FSC I — determining that intermediate 
scrutiny applied because the Statutes were enacted for content-
neutral purposes — could not stand.  FSC III, 825 F.3d at 160.  
We decided that the Statutes are content-based restrictions on 
their face and subject to strict scrutiny because they pertain 
only to visual depictions of actual or simulated sexually 
explicit conduct.  Id.  The Statutes’ restrictions thus “‘depend 
entirely on the communicative content’ of the speech.”  Id. 
(quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 164). 
 
 As a result, we remanded to the District Court to 
consider whether, under the more exacting strict scrutiny 
standard, (1) the two associations, FSC and ASMP, have 
associational standing to bring as-applied claims on behalf of 
their members, (2) the Statutes’ requirements violate the First 
Amendment as applied to the plaintiffs, and (3) those 
requirements should be invalidated facially for overbreadth.  
Remand was necessary because “the level of scrutiny [was] 
relevant in resolving” those issues.  Id. at 164 n.12, 173. 
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4. The District Court’s Decision Following the FSC III 
Remand 
 
After our decision to remand in FSC III and the 
opportunity to supplement the record, the parties cross-moved 
for entry of judgment on the First Amendment claims.  The 
District Court first held that FSC and ASMP lack associational 
standing to bring as-applied First Amendment claims on behalf 
of their members.  Then, for the remaining plaintiffs’ as-
applied claims, the District Court ruled that the age verification 
requirement survives the First Amendment as applied to 
primary producers, but violates the First Amendment as 
applied to secondary producers; that the recordkeeping and 
labeling requirements violate the First Amendment as applied 
to both primary and secondary producers; and that the Statutes’ 
criminal penalties violate the First Amendment to the extent 
they are used to enforce requirements that themselves are 
unconstitutional.  Next, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ 
overbreadth claim because they failed to meet their burden of 
showing that the unconstitutional applications of the Statutes 
render them substantially overbroad.  Finally, based on the 
successful as-applied claims, the District Court determined that 
the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting all 
enforcement of the requirements it found to be 
unconstitutional. 
 
The plaintiffs and the Government timely cross-
appealed.  Together, the cross-appeals put all of the above 
District Court rulings at issue.4 
 
4  The District Court also enjoined enforcement of the 
Statutes’ inspection provisions, which require producers to 
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
We begin by considering the District Court’s First 
Amendment rulings.5  We review legal questions about a 
party’s standing to sue and the constitutionality of federal laws 
de novo.  In re Subpoena 2018R00776, 947 F.3d 148, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2020); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Cnty. of 
Lehigh, 933 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2019).  Ordinarily, we will 
not disturb factual findings following a bench trial absent clear 
error.  Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. TVM Bldg. Prods., Inc., 
855 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2017).  But for those facts relevant 
to First Amendment claims, we “have a duty to engage in a 
searching, independent factual review of the full record,” 
ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quotation marks omitted), because “the reaches of the First 
Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to 
embrace,” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. 
of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995).  Our independent review of 
 
make the records required by the Statutes “available to the 
Attorney General for inspection at all reasonable times.”  18 
U.S.C. §§ 2257(c), 2257A(c); see also id. §§ 2257(f)(5), 
2257A(f)(5) (making it unlawful to “refuse to permit” the 
Attorney General to conduct such an inspection); 28 C.F.R. § 
75.5 (implementing regulation for inspection requirement).  
The District Court entered that relief because we held in FSC 
III that the inspection provisions “are facially unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  825 F.3d at 154.  In this cross-
appeal, no party contests that aspect of the District Court’s 
order.   
5  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the record, therefore, is necessary to ensure that “the judgment 
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression.”  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). 
 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. I.  “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (alteration in 
original) (quotation marks omitted).  Such content-based laws 
“have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives 
and thoughts of a free people.”  Ashcroft v. ACLU (“Ashcroft 
II”), 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).  “To guard against that threat,” 
id., the First Amendment requires that we apply “strict 
scrutiny” to content-based restrictions on speech, Reed, 576 
U.S. at 163–64.  Under strict scrutiny, a content-based 
restriction is “presumptively unconstitutional,” id. at 163, and 
may be justified only if the Government shows that the 
restriction “(1) serves a compelling governmental interest; (2) 
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) is the least 
restrictive means of advancing that interest,” In re Subpoena 
2018R00776, 947 F.3d at 156 (alterations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
We previously determined that the Statutes’ 
requirements are content-based restrictions subject to strict 
scrutiny because the Statutes apply only when visual 
depictions show “actual sexually explicit conduct” or 
“simulated sexually explicit conduct.”  FSC III, 825 F.3d at 
160 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2257(a)(1), 2257A(a)(1)).  The 
Statutes’ restrictions therefore “‘depend entirely on the 
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communicative content’ of the speech.”  Id. (quoting Reed, 576 
U.S. at 164).  We also determined that the plaintiffs do not 
dispute the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test.  
The plaintiffs conceded that “the Government’s interest in 
protecting children from sexual exploitation by pornographers 
is compelling.”  Id. at 164 n.11.6  In the analysis that follows, 
we consider FSC’s and ASMP’s associational standing to bring 
as-applied claims on behalf of their members, as well as the 
merits of the plaintiffs’ as-applied and overbreadth claims. 
 
A. Associational Standing 
 
We first address FSC’s and ASMP’s associational 
standing to bring as-applied claims on behalf of their members.  
We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the two 
associations’ as-applied claims for lack of standing. 
 
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to 
deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”  Dep’t of Commerce v. 
New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019) (quoting U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1).  “For a legal dispute to qualify as a genuine 
case or controversy,” a plaintiff “must have standing to sue,” 
id., and an association may have such standing “as a 
representative of its members,” Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green 
Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Associational standing requires an association to show that (1) 
 
6  The plaintiffs dispute whether the problems the Statutes 
aim to solve are real.  We already rejected that argument in our 
FSC I decision, so we need not rehash that issue here.  See 677 
F.3d at 535 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the Government 
failed to show “the problems identified are real, not 
conjectural”). 
  
19 
its “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right”; (2) “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to 
the organization’s purpose”; and (3) “neither the claim asserted 
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit.”  Id. (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State 
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).   
 
While the first two prongs of the associational standing 
test derive from Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, 
ensuring that a representative association has “a stake in the 
resolution of the dispute,” the third prong is a prudential 
“judicially self-imposed” limit for “administrative 
convenience and efficiency.”  United Food & Com. Workers 
Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 554–57 
(1996) (quotation marks omitted).  The third prong’s 
requirement — that “neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members” — 
protects “against the hazard of litigating a case . . . only to find” 
that the representative association lacks “detailed records or 
the evidence necessary to show . . . harm with sufficient 
specificity.”  Id. at 553, 556 (quotation marks omitted).  For 
that reason, “conferring associational standing” is “improper 
for claims requiring a fact-intensive-individual inquiry.”  Pa. 
Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 286; see also Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 289 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(concluding organization lacked standing to sue on behalf of 
its members because of the “highly individualized nature” of 
the claims). 
 
When we applied intermediate scrutiny to FSC’s and 
ASMP’s as-applied claims on behalf of their members, we 
decided that the associations could not satisfy the third prong 
of the associational standing test.  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 154.  
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FSC’s and ASMP’s as-applied claims required their members’ 
individual participation because the narrow tailoring inquiry 
raised “whether the Statutes and regulations are sufficiently 
circumscribed” as applied to the “specific conduct” of each 
member.  Id. at 153.  Despite FSC’s and ASMP’s attempt to 
escape that standing defect by converting their as-applied 
claims on behalf of their members into a collective one on 
behalf of the “entire adult film industry,” we rejected that 
theory.  Id.  “[N]either FSC nor ASMP represents ‘the adult 
film industry’ as a whole,” id., and even though their members 
“collectively produce a significant portion of the works 
generated by the adult film industry, aggregating that 
industry’s speech in toto is an improper method for identifying 
the burdens imposed on specific members,” id. at 154.  
“Generalized statements regarding the adult film industry’s 
speech” could not “replace the individualized inquiry 
required.”  Id. 
 
FSC and ASMP argue that the outcome should be 
different now because under strict scrutiny, individualized 
inquiry for each of their members is no longer necessary.  In 
support, they claim that if the Government fails to rebut a less 
restrictive alternative as to one association member, the 
Statutes violate the First Amendment as applied to all of FSC’s 
and ASMP’s members. 
 
The associations’ argument is unavailing.  An as-
applied claimant “asserts that the acts of his that are the subject 
of the litigation fall outside what a properly drawn prohibition 
could cover.”  Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 482 (1989); see also Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 
200, 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that an as-applied equal 
protection challenge turned on the plaintiff’s “particular 
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circumstances at hand”).  Strict scrutiny does not change the 
individualized inquiry required for an as-applied claim:  An 
“as-applied attack” to a content-based restriction contends that 
a law’s “application to a particular person under particular 
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.”  
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010); 
see also Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754 
(8th Cir. 2019) (“In an as-applied challenge . . . , the focus of 
the strict-scrutiny test is on the actual speech being regulated, 
rather than how the law might affect others who are not before 
the court.”).  Under strict scrutiny, FSC’s and ASMP’s as-
applied claims still require an individualized inquiry for each 
association member.   
 
That FSC’s and ASMP’s individual members work in 
many different facets of the adult film industry illustrates our 
conclusion.  FSC highlights that it has “about 800 members” 
who engage in producing and distributing sexually explicit 
depictions, ranging from directors, producers, writers, 
cameramen, and lighting technicians, to sellers of sexually 
explicit depictions farther down the “stream of commerce.”  
Pls. Br. 40 (quotation marks omitted).  And ASMP emphasizes 
that its “some 400” photographers take sexually explicit 
photographs across a “broad range of genres.”  Id.  Given the 
diversity of circumstances presented by FSC’s and ASMP’s 
membership, “facts matter, and what may be narrowly drawn 
and the least restrictive means” for one association member 
“will not necessarily be so” for another.  Marcavage, 609 F.3d 
at 288; see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“It is axiomatic that a statute may 
be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as 
applied to another.” (quotation marks omitted)).  FSC’s and 
ASMP’s as-applied claims require individualized inquiry, and 
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the two associations therefore lack standing to bring those 
claims on behalf of their members. 
 
B. As-Applied Claims 
 
We next turn to the ten other plaintiffs’ as-applied 
claims.  The remaining plaintiffs contend that the Statutes’ age 
verification, recordkeeping, and labeling requirements, and the 
regulations that implement those requirements, violate the First 
Amendment.  They separately assert that the criminal penalties 
for noncompliance with the Statutes’ requirements cannot 
withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.  We address 
these as-applied claims in turn. 
 
1. Age Verification, Recordkeeping, and Labeling 
Requirements 
 
The District Court upheld the age verification 
requirement as applied to primary producers, but invalidated 
that requirement as applied to secondary producers.  In 
addition, the District Court struck down the recordkeeping and 
labeling requirements as applied to both primary and 
secondary producers.  We will affirm in part and reverse in 
part.  We conclude that for the plaintiffs with standing to bring 
as-applied claims, the age verification, recordkeeping, and 
labeling requirements all violate the First Amendment. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the age verification, 
recordkeeping, and labeling requirements violate the First 
Amendment as applied to them.  They propose that as applied, 
Congress could have used a less restrictive alternative by 
limiting the age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling 
requirements to circumstances where a performer in a sexually 
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explicit depiction “might reasonably appear” to be a child.  Pls. 
Br. 24.  The plaintiffs explain that when a performer in a 
sexually explicit depiction is a “mature adult[],” there is no 
chance that the performer might be a child.  Pls. Br. 26.  So, 
the plaintiffs’ argument goes, because the age verification, 
recordkeeping, and labeling requirements apply regardless of a 
performer’s age, the requirements unnecessarily restrict the 
plaintiffs’ speech when there is no risk a child was harmed.  
 
We agree.  The age verification, recordkeeping, and 
labeling requirements protect children when a sexually explicit 
depiction shows a young-looking performer who could be a 
child.  In that circumstance, the requirements serve the 
Government’s compelling interest in protecting children by 
ensuring that producers of sexually explicit depictions 
“confirm” performers are not children, preventing “children 
from passing themselves off as adults” to producers, and 
eliminating “subjective disputes” over whether a producer 
should have verified a performer’s age.  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 535.  
But the age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling 
requirements need not prevent all mistakes about age to protect 
children from sexual exploitation.  The requirements “do not 
advance the Government’s interest” when sexually explicit 
depictions show “performers whom no reasonable person 
could mistake” for a child.  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 157.  
  
After our decision to remand for the application of strict 
scrutiny, the Government conceded in the District Court that 
“the age range where there is a real possibility of mistaking a 
child for an adult extends to 30 years old,” and highlighted that 
it had “never taken the position” that children “could be 
confused for clearly mature adults,” at least when “the 
individuals depicted are clearly visible in the image.”  District 
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Court Docket Index (“D.I.”) 265 at 13.  Nor could it have 
because the Government’s expert on pubertal maturation, 
Francis Biro, testified at trial that “the vast majority of adults 
30 years of age or older could not be mistaken for a minor.”  
FSC II, 787 F.3d at 156 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
Based on that point, the Government argued, if “the 
Statutes do not survive strict scrutiny in their entirety,” they 
should be invalidated “only to the extent that they apply to 
plaintiffs’ production of images showing clearly mature adults 
over the age of 30.”  D.I. 265 at 18 n.12, 19 (capitalization 
omitted).  According to the Government, the Statutes would 
still “function effectively as an independent whole” because 
“the core goals” of the Statutes “are served by applying the 
Statutes to images showing young-looking people, even if no 
records are required for” performers who are clearly adults.  
D.I. 265 at 18–19 n.12, 22.  Later, at oral argument in this 
appeal, the Government confirmed that its position for the 
plaintiffs’ as-applied claims was to limit the Statutes “to 
images depicting young people under 30 years of age.”  (Oral 
Arg. Tr. 6:3-8.)  
 
The Government’s concessions mean that as applied to 
the plaintiffs, the age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling 
requirements could be less restrictive if they did not apply 
when the plaintiffs depict performers who are at least thirty 
years old and the performer is clearly shown in the depiction. 
The record confirms that a substantial percentage of the 
plaintiffs’ performers are at least thirty years old:  55% for 
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Dodson and Ross,7 59.7% for Levine, 40% for Levingston, 
52.63% for Nitke, 66.02% for the Sinclair Institute, and 76% 
for Steinberg.  See FSC II, 787 F.3d at 158.  Likewise, the “vast 
majority” of participants in Queen’s live-streamed show were 
in their thirties and forties.  Id.  Although the record does not 
reflect the age breakdowns of the performers in the depictions 
that Alper creates or the depictions that Hymes posts on his 
website, the Government bears the burden of disproving the 
plaintiffs’ proposed alternative.  Quite the opposite of making 
that showing, the Government agrees that all of the “plaintiffs 
are unlike the mine run of pornography producers because they 
do not generally cater to the marketplace’s appetite for viewing 
young-looking people in sexually explicit depictions.”  Gov’t 
Reply Br. 47.  For these plaintiffs, then, there is a “less 
restrictive alternative” that “would serve the Government’s 
purpose.”  United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 813 (2000).  The age verification, recordkeeping, and 
 
7  The Government argues that limiting the Statutes’ 
requirements to producers of sexually explicit depictions 
clearly showing performers who are at least thirty years old 
would not be any less restrictive for plaintiffs Dodson and 
Ross, specifically, because their website displays anonymous 
pictures of genitals, so performers are not clearly shown in 
those images.  The Government’s point is not borne out by the 
record.  Dodson and Ross also produce other sexually explicit 
depictions that do clearly show performers who are at least 
thirty years old.  See D.I. 221 (Trial Tr. 159:16-17, 160:7-12, 
162:19–163:18) (Ross testifying that Dodson and Ross have 
produced sexually explicit depictions showing performers over 
age thirty).  Therefore, under the plaintiffs’ proposed 
alternative, the Statutes would be less restrictive for these two 
plaintiffs.   
  
26 
labeling requirements restrict the plaintiffs’ “speech without an 
adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not 
permit.”  Id. 
 
The Government sets out to save the Statutes’ 
requirements, as applied to the plaintiffs, by relying on a reason 
we gave when we upheld the Statutes under intermediate 
scrutiny:  the plaintiffs “do not face a substantial additional 
burden attributable to keeping records for clearly mature 
performers on top of the records they must maintain for young 
performers” because “most of the burden” the plaintiffs “face 
under the Statutes is due to the procedures they must put in 
place to store, organize, and make available records for 
performers generally.”  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 159.  Based on that 
intermediate scrutiny reasoning, the Government asserts that 
the age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling requirements 
should pass strict scrutiny, as well. 
 
We are not convinced.  The number of older performers 
employed by the plaintiffs “is not insignificant,” and requiring 
age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling for depictions of 
those clearly adult performers “does not protect children.”  Id. 
at 158.  Strict scrutiny demands that “[i]f a less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative.”  Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 
529 U.S. at 813.  The availability of a less restrictive alternative 
for these plaintiffs thus makes clear that the age verification, 
recordkeeping, and labeling requirements violate the First 
Amendment as applied to them.8 
 
8  The plaintiffs propose several other alternatives to the 
Statutes’ requirements that they claim would make the Statutes 
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2. Criminal Penalties 
 
We consider separately the plaintiffs’ as-applied 
challenge to the Statutes’ criminal penalties attached to 
violations of the Statutes’ age verification, recordkeeping, and 
labeling requirements.  The District Court held that the 
criminal penalties cannot be applied to enforce restrictions that 
themselves violate the First Amendment.  We will affirm, but 
we reach that conclusion on different grounds than the District 
Court. 
 
The plaintiffs posit that regardless of whether the age 
verification, recordkeeping, and labeling requirements are 
constitutional, the attendant statutory criminal penalties should 
be invalidated under the First Amendment.  In the plaintiffs’ 
view, because the Statutes’ penalties are criminal in kind, they 
are too harsh and would be less restrictive if they were 
administrative sanctions instead.  The District Court relied on 
this reasoning when it invalidated the Statutes’ criminal 
penalties. 
 
The plaintiffs’ reasoning does not persuade us.  The 
plaintiffs have not cited any authority for their position that 
under the First Amendment, we may strike down the penalty 
for noncompliance with a restriction on speech only because 
the penalty is criminal in kind.  We have not found any 
authority for that position, either.  To the contrary, three 
reasons lead us to conclude that the Statutes’ penalties do not 
 
less restrictive as applied to them.  Given our as-applied ruling 
for the plaintiffs, we need not address those alternatives.   
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offend the First Amendment simply because of their criminal 
character. 
 
First, the kind of penalty that Congress chose is not, by 
itself, subject to First Amendment review because a penalty for 
noncompliance with a restriction on speech is not equivalent to 
a restriction on speech.  See Long Beach Area Peace Network 
v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(distinguishing First Amendment review of an ordinance 
restricting speech from the “misdemeanor penalty” attached to 
a violation of the ordinance’s restriction); Christine Jolls, Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1517 (1998) (“[N]o one 
has suggested that the First Amendment imposes limits on the 
severity of punishment for speech that the government is 
entitled to criminalize.”).  The distinction between a restriction 
on speech and a penalty for a violation of that restriction is 
central.  Whether the consequence for noncompliance with the 
Statutes is a criminal punishment or an administrative sanction, 
the Statutes require the plaintiffs to verify performers’ ages and 
identities, keep records of performers’ identification 
documents, and label their depictions with the locations of 
those records.  So the Statutes impose no more restrictions on 
the plaintiffs’ speech because the penalties for noncompliance 
are criminal, and would impose no fewer restrictions if the 
penalties were administrative.  As a result, the kind of penalty 
that Congress chose is not a basis to decide that the Statutes 
could be less restrictive. 
 
Second, the plaintiffs’ position does not comport with 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  Their 
position boils down to an assertion that a less severe penalty 
should be more likely to survive First Amendment review 
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because a less severe penalty is less restrictive of speech.  That 
does not accord with the Supreme Court’s recognition that the 
First Amendment shields against governmental efforts to 
restrict free speech even when enforced through “trivial” forms 
of punishment.  Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 
75 n.8 (1990).  Nor can the plaintiffs’ position be reconciled 
with the Supreme Court’s determination that even though a 
state racketeering statute provided “stiffer” and “obviously 
greater” criminal penalties than the penalties attached to a 
predicate offense, the difference in the severity of the 
punishments was not “constitutionally significant” for a First 
Amendment challenge to the racketeering statute.  Fort Wayne 
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 59, 60 (1989).  Of course, 
a severe criminal penalty can have a chilling effect on speech.  
See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 660 (“Content-based prohibitions, 
enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant 
potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a 
free people.”).  But that deterrent effect, alone, does not 
warrant invalidating a penalty on First Amendment grounds.  
See Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. at 59, 60 (rejecting 
argument that “sanctions imposed” were so “draconian” that 
they had “an improper chilling effect on First Amendment 
freedoms” because “[t]he mere assertion of some possible self-
censorship” was “not enough” to render a statute 
“unconstitutional”). 
 
Third, when restrictions of speech survive constitutional 
scrutiny, it is not for federal courts to limit Congress “in 
resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law” to 
enforce those restrictions.  Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 
U.S. 436, 441 (1957); accord Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. 
at 60.  Whether violations of the Statutes’ requirements are “to 
be visited by a criminal prosecution” or some other 
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administrative penalty is “a matter within the legislature’s 
range of choice.”  Kingsley Books, Inc., 354 U.S. at 441.  This 
point carries even greater weight when Congress chooses to 
rely on criminal penalties for enforcement because 
“[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to 
the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”  
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); see also United 
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (“[J]udgments 
about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the 
first instance to the legislature.”); Gore v. United States, 357 
U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be entertained 
regarding severity of punishment, . . . these are peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy.”). 
 
On the other hand, the Government may not enforce 
penalties for noncompliance with laws that the Constitution 
prohibits.  We therefore ultimately arrive at the same 
conclusion the District Court reached:  because we have 
concluded that the age verification, recordkeeping, and 
labeling requirements violate the First Amendment as applied 
to some of the plaintiffs, the criminal penalties for violating 
those provisions cannot be applied to those plaintiffs, either. 
 
C. Overbreadth Claim 
 
The plaintiffs also levy a facial attack on the Statutes’ 
requirements under the First Amendment overbreadth 
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doctrine.9  We will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim. 
 
A law may be invalidated facially as “overbroad” if “a 
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, 
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quotation 
marks omitted).  An “overbreadth claimant bears the burden of 
demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact, 
that substantial overbreadth exists.”  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 
U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (alterations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481 (invalidating a 
content-based statute for substantial overbreadth because “the 
presumptively impermissible applications” of the challenged 
statute “far outnumber any permissible ones”).  
  
 
9  Ordinarily, we do not reach an overbreadth claim when 
presented with a successful as-applied claim because “[i]t is 
not the usual judicial practice . . . nor . . . generally desirable, 
to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily.”  Fox, 492 
U.S. at 484–85.  Here, however, only some plaintiffs have 
standing to bring as-applied claims.  See supra Section II.A.  
Thus, we confront the plaintiffs’ other First Amendment 
challenge based on overbreadth.  Indeed, “[t]he First 
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth was designed as a 
departure from traditional rules of standing, to enable persons 
who are themselves unharmed by the defect in a statute 
nevertheless to challenge that statute on the ground that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other 
situations not before the Court.”  Fox, 492 U.S. at 484 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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“The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the 
challenged statute” because “it is impossible to determine 
whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what 
the statute covers.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
293 (2008).  We decided before that “the plain language of the 
Statutes makes clear that they apply broadly to all producers of 
actual or simulated sexually explicit depictions regardless of 
whether those depictions were created for the purpose of sale 
or trade.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 539.  As a result, the “Statutes 
reach essentially the entire universe of sexually explicit 
images, ‘including private, noncommercial depictions created 
and viewed by adults in their homes.’”  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 161 
(quoting FSC I, 677 F.3d at 538).  Nothing about the scope of 
the Statutes has changed since we last considered the question, 
so we reach the same conclusion here. 
 
To succeed on their overbreadth claim, the plaintiffs 
must carry the burden of establishing that invalid applications 
of the Statutes make them substantially overbroad.  That is 
because the overbreadth doctrine “seeks to strike a balance 
between competing social costs.”  Williams, 553 U.S. at 292.  
On one side of the scale, “the threat of enforcement of an 
overbroad law deters people from engaging in constitutionally 
protected speech, inhibiting the free exchange of ideas.”  Id.  
On the other side of the scale, “invalidating a law that in some 
of its applications is perfectly constitutional — particularly a 
law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made 
criminal — has obvious harmful effects.”  Id.  To “maintain an 
appropriate balance,” the Supreme Court has “vigorously 
enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be 
substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  Id.  So when 
addressing whether a law suffers from substantial overbreadth, 
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we must weigh “‘the number of valid applications’ of the 
statute,” “the historic or likely frequency of conceivably 
impermissible applications,” “the nature of the [government’s] 
interest underlying the regulation,” and “the nature of the 
activity or conduct sought to be regulated.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 
537–38 (quoting Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 
355 F.3d 215, 226 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 
We balanced those factors when we rejected the 
plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim in our previous opinion, which 
was vacated following the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed.  
See FSC II, 787 F.3d at 160–66.  Those factors still counsel 
against invalidating the Statutes’ requirements for overbreadth 
because our prior analysis continues to resonate.  See Real 
Alts. Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 
338, 356 n.18 (3d Cir. 2017) (observing that although a vacated 
opinion was not “controlling,” it remained persuasive).   
 
1. Valid Applications 
 
Our prior reasoning with respect to the Statutes’ valid 
applications retains its force.  We explained that the Statutes’ 
requirements validly apply when producers create sexually 
explicit depictions showing young-looking performers who 
could be children.  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 161.  We determined 
that this “legitimate sweep of the Statutes is vast” because a 
careful examination of the expert testimony at trial revealed 
that there is a substantial universe of online pornography 
depicting young-looking performers.  Id.  For instance, the 
Government’s expert, Gail Dines, identified that “the top three 
pornographic Internet websites contain 17.97 million pages” 
with “words clearly related to young adults,” amounting to 
“34.2% of all pages within these pornographic sites.”  Id. 
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(footnote omitted). And, that 17.97 million-page estimate 
understated “the full swath of sexually explicit materials to 
which the Statutes validly apply.”  Id. at 162.  Moreover, “after 
examining all 61 categories of pornographic material on a top 
pornographic website — at the time, the 40th most visited 
website in the United States — Dines found that the overriding 
image is of a youthful looking woman.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  It is clear that the Statutes’ valid applications are 
extensive. 
 
2. Impermissible Applications 
 
Our analysis of the impermissible applications of the 
Statutes continues to counsel against overbreadth, as well.  We 
previously reasoned that the Statutes impermissibly apply to 
(1) producers of sexually explicit depictions exclusively 
showing individuals who are clearly adults, FSC II, 787 F.3d 
at 156, and (2) adults who share sexually explicit images 
between themselves for purely private purposes, id. at 163 & 
n.14.  As to the first, we explained that applying the Statutes 
when depictions show an individual who is clearly an adult 
“does nothing” to further the Government’s interest in 
protecting children.  Id. at 156.  As to the second, the 
Government had not tried to defend the constitutionality of 
applying the Statutes to purely private sexually explicit 
depictions shared between consenting adults.  Id. at 163 n.14. 
 
The plaintiffs do not contest our prior weighing of these 
two invalid applications against the Statutes’ vast legitimate 
sweep.  Based on the evidence presented at trial, the plaintiffs 
showed “to a limited degree, a universe of sexually explicit 
images that depict only clearly mature adults,” and a “universe 
of private sexually explicit images not intended for sale or 
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trade.”  Id. at 164.  Even so, without reducing our inquiry into 
a purely numerical comparison, we concluded that the scope of 
the two invalid applications of the Statutes “pale[s] in 
comparison” to the Statutes’ legitimate sweep, which 
“counsels against holding the Statutes facially invalid.”  Id. 
 
Rather than challenge that evaluation of the record, the 
plaintiffs assert that our balancing of the Statutes’ invalid 
applications against their valid applications should come out 
differently now because the District Court found the Statutes 
invalid as applied in a third circumstance:  to secondary 
producers who play no role in the creation of sexually explicit 
content.  In their view, adding that additional unconstitutional 
application “magnifie[s]” the Statutes’ “overreach.”  D.I. 246 
at 17.10   
 
We are not convinced.  The plaintiffs have not carried 
their heavy burden of showing that we should resort to the 
“strong medicine” of the overbreadth doctrine to facially 
invalidate the Statutes, a tool to be used “sparingly and only as 
a last resort.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 
 
10  To the extent the plaintiffs argue that a content-based 
regulation must be narrowly tailored to survive an overbreadth 
challenge, see, e.g., Pls. Reply Br. 14–15, we disagree.  
“Although overbreadth and narrow tailoring are related, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the . . . assertion that [a law] must 
precisely target the acts it was passed to remedy.”  Turco v. 
City of Englewood, 935 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 2019) (footnote 
omitted) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730–31 (2000) 
(“The fact that the coverage of a statute is broader than the 
specific concern that led to its enactment is of no constitutional 
significance”)). 
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(1973).  We assume without deciding that applying the Statutes 
to secondary producers violates the First Amendment.  
Nevertheless, missing from the plaintiffs’ argument is any 
specific explanation regarding how much larger this makes the 
swath of invalid applications and why this particular 
application should tip the overbreadth scale in their favor.  
 
For example, the plaintiffs have not argued how widely 
the universe of secondary producers extends as compared to 
the Statutes’ legitimate sweep.  And the plaintiffs make no 
effort to show how many producers of sexually explicit 
depictions are exclusively secondary producers.  That is 
significant because “[t]he same person may be both a primary 
and a secondary producer.”  28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(3).  Excluding 
from the Statutes’ coverage those secondary producers who 
occupy a dual role, then, would do little, if anything, to reduce 
the Statutes’ supposed overreach because those secondary 
producers would still need to comply as primary producers.  
These omissions doom the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim.  At 
bottom, the plaintiffs have failed to prove “from actual fact” 
that the Statutes’ application to secondary producers renders 
the Statutes substantially overbroad.  Virginia, 539 U.S. at 122 
(quotation marks omitted).   
 
3. Nature of the Government’s Interest and of the Activity 
Targeted 
 
Last, when we rejected the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim 
previously, we underscored the “‘surpassing importance’ of 
the Government’s compelling interest” in protecting children 
from sexual exploitation by pornographers and the nature of 
the activity that the Statutes aim to regulate.  FSC II, 787 F.3d 
at 166 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 
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(1982)).  Those factors still counsel against invalidating the 
Statutes for overbreadth. 
   
“Child pornography harms and debases the most 
defenseless of our citizens,” Williams, 553 U.S. at 307, and 
“[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act 
repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people,” Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).  And the 
Statutes aim to “stem the tide of child pornography only after” 
Congress found “direct prohibitions” on child pornography to 
be “insufficiently effective.”  FSC II, 787 F.3d at 166.  “The 
financial benefits accruing to producers from using youthful 
models as well as the financial benefits those models 
themselves enjoy, together with the difficulty of differentiating 
youthful adults from minors, all combine to increase the risks 
of children being exploited.”  Id.   
 
*  * * 
 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs have not carried their burden 
of proving that the Statutes’ requirements are substantially 
overbroad.  We therefore will affirm the District Court’s order 
denying the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim.  
 
III. INJUNCTION 
 
Last, the Government argues that the District Court 
erred in entering, as the Government describes it, a 
“nationwide injunction.”  Gov’t Br. 37.  We review a district 
court’s entry of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion.  
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  
“A district court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on an 
incorrect legal standard, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or 
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a misapplication of the law to the facts.”  TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 
928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
The District Court entered a permanent injunction 
against enforcement of the provisions that it held were 
unconstitutional as applied to ten plaintiffs, but the injunction 
prohibited the Government from enforcing those provisions 
against any producer subject to the Statutes.  For that reason, 
the Government contends that the injunction provided more 
relief than necessary to the few plaintiffs who succeeded on 
their as-applied claims only.11  
 
We agree.  Although a district court has “considerable 
discretion in framing injunctions,” that discretion is cabined.  
Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 648 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 
2011).  “An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, 
 
11  In briefing, the Government refers to the relief entered 
as a nationwide injunction.  That terminology strikes us as 
imprecise.  The issue that the Government raises is not the 
geographic scope of the injunction.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(explaining that although “‘[n]ationwide injunction[]’ is 
perhaps . . . more common,” the “term ‘universal injunction[]’” 
is “more precise” when the “geographic breadth” of the 
contested injunction is not what makes it “distinctive”).  
Rather, the Government challenges the universal character of 
the injunction because the Government contests whether the 
District Court properly enjoined it from enforcing the Statutes’ 
requirements against those who are not parties here.  See id. 
(noting that universal injunctions “are distinctive because they 
prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with respect 
to anyone, including nonparties”). 
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which should not be granted as a matter of course.”  Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010).  
“[I]njunctive relief should be no broader than necessary to 
provide full relief to the aggrieved party.”  Meyer, 648 F.3d at 
170 (quoting Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 
F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986)).  “We prefer, for example, to 
enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while 
leaving other applications in force.”  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–
29.  In this case, enjoining enforcement against all producers 
covered by the Statutes was not consistent with the sound 
exercise of discretion for precisely those reasons:  the 
injunction, an extraordinary remedy, afforded more relief than 
necessary to the ten plaintiffs who prevailed on their claims 
that the Statutes and regulations violate the First Amendment 
as applied to their specific circumstances.12   
 
In defense of the scope of the injunction, the plaintiffs 
rely on two Supreme Court decisions, Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), and Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), for the proposition that a successful 
as-applied challenge may lead to broader relief.  But those two 
decisions do not apply here because in each, the Supreme Court 
 
12  The Government also claims that the District Court 
lacked the constitutional power to enter a nationwide 
injunction based on the plaintiffs’ successful as-applied claims.  
We decline the invitation to answer that question because “we 
must avoid deciding a constitutional question if the case may 
be disposed of on some other basis.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. 
& Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, even if the 
District Court had the constitutional power to grant the 
injunction, our “jurisprudence governing injunctive remedies 
will not permit it.”  Ameron, 787 F.2d at 890. 
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relied on the principle that an as-applied constitutional attack 
may result in broader relief if the attack reveals that a law is 
invalid “across the board.”  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2307; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333 (reasoning 
that in “the exercise of its judicial responsibility” it may be 
“necessary . . . for the Court to consider the facial validity” of 
a statute, even though a facial challenge was not brought).   
 
That principle is inapplicable here.  The plaintiffs’ as-
applied claims do not show that the Statutes are invalid as 
applied to all producers covered by the Statutes.  Most 
critically, the successful as-applied plaintiffs often feature 
older individuals in their sexually explicit depictions — a 
factual circumstance at the center of their successful as-applied 
claims and one which sets the plaintiffs apart from the more 
typical category of pornographers who rely on young-looking 
performers.  Furthermore, the successful as-applied plaintiffs 
are not what may be considered ordinary pornographers.  In its 
post-trial opinion, the District Court found that four of the 
plaintiffs — Steinberg, Alper, Levingston, and Nitke — are 
commercial photographer-artists, Free Speech Coal., Inc., 957 
F. Supp. 2d at 572–73; five others — Queen, Ross, Dodson, 
Levine, and the Sinclair Institute — produce sex education 
materials, id. at 574, 575; and the last, Hymes, is a journalist, 
id. at 574.  And all of these plaintiffs, save Sinclair, are “niche” 
players in the adult pornography industry who take “unique 
and often creative approaches to sexually explicit conduct.”  Id. 
at 583.  The plaintiffs’ meritorious as-applied claims, thus, 
were not a sound basis to enjoin enforcement of the Statutes’ 
unconstitutional requirements against all other producers of 
sexually explicit depictions, whose circumstances may be 
different.  
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Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
entering a nationwide injunction and remand for the entry of 
relief limited to the successful as-applied plaintiffs.  
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and vacate in part the District Court’s order entered on August 
6, 2018, and will remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
